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Introduction
CHAPTER 6
Mathematization and Modern Science
Let us take stock of where we are in the process of tracing Western mathe-
matization. Some ancient Greek philosophers had abstractly asserted the
preeminence of mathematics for understanding the nature and structure of
reality. Other Greeks promoted mathematics more concretely by developing
mathematical theories of natural phenomena such as Archimedes' treatment
of the law of the lever. However, much of what we now call natural science
remained unaltered in any essential way by mathematics. Various writers in
the medieval period continued the rhetoric of mathernatization, but they
provided little solid evidence to back it up. Later thinkers instead followed
Aristotle, emphasizing the importance of logical argumentation for natural
philosophy and viewing each science as having its own (non-mathematical)
subject matter. Mathematics was a field to imitate on account of its deduc-
tive method, not one to apply because of its subject matter. An exception to
this occurred near the end of the Middle Ages, when the Oxford Calculators
developed a mathematical theory of motion, but this remained tied to ab-
stract philosophy.
Renaissance thinkers valued mathematics highly on account of its log-
ical structure and the certainty of its conclusions, but they also put it to work
in practical and artistic affairs. While they still thought largely in Aristote-
lian terms about natural phenomena, habits of measurement and quantifi-
cation were becoming ingrained in everyday life and provided a platform for
seventeenth-century developments in science. As Greek knowledge was be-
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ing reassimilated during the Renaissance, old ideas were also being chal-
lenged, in part due to discoveries made on voyages to new lands. New ideas
and techniques were arising in astronomy, algebra, and computational arith-
metic, often in connection with projects that sought to restore mathematics
to its ancient glory. Activities that lay at the juncture of practical affairs and
mathematical science, such as architecture, engineering, and gunnery, also
made advances in the sixteenth century. Furthermore, the Renaissance saw
the rebirth and spread of philosophies that asserted the supremacy of math-
ematics. Since mathematics had proved itself so well on a human scale in Re-
naissance culture, expanding its applicability to cosmic proportions seemed
reasonable. While neither Platonism nor Hermetic philosophy was overly
disposed toward an experimental or mechanical approach to natural philos-
ophy, they did contribute to an intellectual climate that challenged Aristotle
and promoted the mathematization of science.
Aristotelian natural philosophy came under fire on a philosophical
level in the seventeenth century, but that was not the most important show-
down. It was the successful outworking of a quantitative outlook within as-
tronomy and mechanics that finally ended Aristotle's domination of natural
philosophy. The immense success of mathematized science throughout the
century encouraged people to push the program into other areas of natural
science and even into the human and social sciences.
Seventeenth-Century Mathematization
of Natural Science
The seventeenth century produced unprecedented advances in mathemati-
zation, During this period mathematics was harnessed to a mechanistic pro-
gram of natural philosophy. Science began to be mathematized in a way that
anchored it in experienced measurable behavior of natural phenomena. 1
This development began in the mathematical sciences of astronomy and
mechanics, where quantification already held a strong position and was even
sanctioned by a modern version of Aristotelian natural philosophy that up-
1. Peter Dear traces various sixteenth- and seventeenth-century developments, link-
ing quantification with different notions of experience and experimentation. See his Disci-
pline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1995).
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held the legitimacy of mixing science and mathematics. However, the newly
discovered work of Archimedes in mathematical physics was the crucial fac-
tor driving this development. It gave scientists an important model and
some essential tools for pursuing the project.
The two most important mathematicians who battled the traditional
physics and astronomy of Aristotle and Ptolemy were Kepler' (1571-1630)
and Galileo (1564-1642). In different ways and independently of one an-
other, they attempted to establish Copernicus' view of the universe, both
with their scientific findings and their defense of its reasonableness. In Gali-
leo's case, this was part of a broader attack on Aristotelian natural philoso-
phy. He also developed a new mathematical science of motion that contra-
dicted Aristotle's views. Kepler's main work was in astronomy, but he also
made an important contribution to the field of ocular optics. Both of them
were strong proponents of a mathematical viewpoint on nature; both of
them made lasting contributions to mathematical physics. Thus we begin
our story of the greatest advances of mathematization with their work.
Kepler's Mathematical Vision of the World
Kepler studied nature to gain a deeper understanding of its Creator. Kepler's
success in revealing the secrets of God's magnificent work was offered back
to him with exuberant praise and devotion. In an era of religious discord,
Kepler was a Lutheran with sympathies toward both Calvinist and Roman
Catholic positions on certain theological issues. What was most important
for his scientific work, however, was his view of God as Creator. Here his
ideas derive primarily from Neoplatonic/Neopythagorean philosophy. For
Kepler, God is the Supreme Architect, the one who created the universe ac-
cording to eternal geometric patterns located in his mind. As Kepler notes:
Geometry, being part of the divine mind from time immemorial, from
before the origin of things, being God Himself (for what is in God that is
not God Himself?), has supplied God with the models for the creation of
the world.'
2. Max Caspar, Kepler, revised edition (New York: Dover, 1993), p. 271. This quote
appears in Kepler's work of 1619, but it represents his viewpoint throughout his life.
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Thus, Kepler believed that God had embodied some of his essential
mathematical nature in the creation. Being created in God's image, we hu-
mans can think his thoughts after him, using the ideas of number and mag-
nitude he has implanted in our minds. True knowledge of natural phenom-
ena can be attained when the geometric schemes in our minds correspond
to those prototypes in the Divine mind that have been copied into the world.
Scientific knowledge results from the use of human reason stimulated by ex-
perience. Because scriptural revelation does not aim to impart knowledge of
nature, it is thus irrelevant to this task. To understand how the universe is
regulated and even to learn more about the being of God, we must search
out the spatial structure of the world and look for proportion and harmoni-
ous relations among its geometric magnitudes.
Kepler's mathematized natural philosophy is clearly seen in his astro-
nomical work. Already as a university student, he became convinced of the
correctness of Copernicus' system, being attracted by its overall simplicity
and its emphasis on symmetry and harmony. After he became a professor of
astronomy, Kepler developed his ideas further. He believed that the five Pla-
tonic solids, whose treatment had provided the grand finale to Euclid's Ele-
ments, could explain the planetary orbits. Using a series of inscribed and cir-
cumscribed spheres separated by the five nested regular solids, Kepler
accounted for the number of the planets and the spacing of their paths along
these spheres. God ordered the planets, he claims, to accord with this beauti-
ful geometric arrangement. He explained this theory in his first astronomi-
cal work, Mysterium Cosmographicum (1596). Although existing astronomi-
cal data failed to support his hypothesis completely, Kepler gave reasons,
including possible inaccuracies of the data, for why his theory might not
quite agree with tabulated values. Kepler came back to this Platonic vision of
the celestial array throughout his life, unwilling to toss it aside. He supple-
mented it in his third astronomical work, Harmonice Mundi (1619), with
various other arcane mathematical ideas, such as the identification of musi-
cal harmonies with planetary motions. This gave wondrous mathematical
detail to the Pythagorean "music of the spheres:' Kepler discovered one of
these harmonious mathematical relations while trying to find a numerical
relationship to demonstrate the Sun's role in propelling planets about their
orbits. This result is now known as Kepler's third law: the squares of the pe-
riods of the revolutions of the planets are proportional to the cubes of their
mean distances from the Sun.
Aspects of Kepler's thought seem to mesh quite well with the blend of
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Platonic and Hermetic philosophies of his time. Kepler was initially at-
tracted to an animistic view of planetary motion ~ that is, that planets were
either beings that had souls or were guided by such beings. However, he soon
abandoned it for a purely mechanical outlook, comparing astronomical mo-
tions to a well-regulated clock. Kepler's use of mathematics also differed
from his more mystical counterparts. Kepler pointed this out in a critique he
gave of a leading Hermetic thinker who had accused his astronomy of not
delving into the inner realities of nature. One must always subject mathe-
matical conjectures to empirical testing, Kepler asserted, and not create
mathematical fantasies. We are bound to the world God made and are not
free to create one of our own. Kepler thus disassociated genuine mathemati-
cal science from numerological speculations and delineated proper uses for
mathematics in opposition to the excesses around him. Astronomy can use
mathematical hypotheses that accord with appearances, but these hypothe-
ses must do even more; they must demonstrate the way things actually work.
The harmonious geometrical structure of reality was an a priori given for
Kepler, but the exact form of the mathematical regularities it exhibited must
be determined from the facts of experience.
This attitude is aptly demonstrated in Kepler's second astronomical
work of 1609, Astronomia Nova. Ten years earlier he had been hired as
Tycho Brahe's mathematical assistant, doing the astronomical calculations
associated with Tycho's program of observations. Kepler took on the task of
calculating Mars' orbit. Given the precise data for which Tycho was known,
Kepler discovered that the accepted ideas about Mars' motion failed to gen-
erate accurate values. Continuing to work on the problem after Tycho's
death in 1601, Kepler eventually found a solution. It was a solution unlike
any he or anyone else had anticipated, however. After years of struggling
with computational and conceptual difficulties, he finally concluded that
the orbit of Mars was an ellipse. This is an instance of Kepler's first law. The
compound circular motions that had been postulated by others to describe
each planet's apparent motion were now replaced by a single, simple, ellip-
tical motion around the Sun, which was located at one focus. In addition to
relinquishing circular motion, Kepler found that he also had to give up uni-
form velocity. Mars moves with uniform velocity only in the sense that its
radius from the Sun sweeps out equal areas in equal times. This is Kepler's
second law. Finding these results took about eight years of patient calcula-
tion with empirical data and involved numerous dead ends and mistakes.
However, Kepler's new astronomy swept away two thousand years of false
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preconceptions and completed Copernicus' system of the world in a sur-
prising and beautiful way.
In addition to discovering these two laws, which he generalized to all
the planets, Kepler insisted that the motion of heavenly bodies required ex-
planation. Traditional natural philosophy kept heaven and earth separate
and saw no need to stipulate a cause for uniform circular celestial motion.
Kepler challenged this. He proposed, for the first time, that physics be com-
bined with mathematical astronomy. He was unable, however, to give a fully
acceptable quantitative explanation for planetary motion (following Gilbert,
he suggested that a rotating Sun pulls the planets around using some sort of
magnetic force). The final outworking of this view had to await Newton's
theory of universal gravitation toward the end of the century. Even so, Kep-
ler's astronomy initiated the idea that the world is a mechanical universe in
which the planets move due to the physical action of the Sun and in obedi-
ence to mathematical laws; they no longer move through the action and will
of quasi-divine beings inhabiting the planets.
Kepler's astronomical writings contained technical mathematical dis-
course, overfull descriptions of the meandering process of his scientific dis-
coveries, Neoplatonic philosophizing, and ecstatic religious utterances. This
unique combination did not attract many readers. The full importance of
his astronomical viewpoint and results were only gradually recognized. Nev-
ertheless, his Epitome Astronomiae Copernicanae (1621) provided the main
source for later scientists, such as Halley and Newton, to learn the basic de-
tails of the Copernican system he had completed.
Galilee's Mathematical View of Nature
Galilee's Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems (1632) was in-
tended as a popular account of the Copernican system, and it was well
known and accepted by many, even though the Roman Catholic Church
quickly moved to ban it. In this book, Galileo presented a witty and engaging
discussion of the merits of the Copernican system over against the en-
trenched coalition of Aristotelian cosmology and Ptolemaic astronomy. He
showed that the usual physical arguments against Copernican astronomy,
arguments directed against the motion of the Earth, are not decisive. The
reason objects do not fly off a whirling world, for instance, is because they
also participate in the Earth's motion, just as a weight dropped from the
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mast of a boat will fall at its base, even if the boat is moving. Galileo defused
the standard criticisms with striking and sometimes humorous counter-
examples dealing with terrestrial motion, a field in which Galileo was very
much at home. In addition to defending Copernicus against his critics, Gali-
leo presented his account of the tides as strong positive evidence for the cor-
rectness of the Copernican system. Consequently, he thought Copernicus'
astronomy approached the requirements set up by Aristotle for being a dem-
onstrative science. This posture got Galileo in trouble with the Church. He
had been given permission to present Copernicus' system of astronomy in
the conventional way, as a hypothetical mathematical theory, not as the true
system of the world.
Galileo had adopted a Copernican outlook already in 1609. Investi-
gating the heavens with a newly invented telescope of his own construction,
he noted the following: the Moon's surface appears to be irregularly shaped,
not perfectly spherical; the Sun shows spots that change; Venus goes through
phases like the Moon, indicating its revolution about the Sun; and Jupiter
has four moons that circle it, rather than the Earth. These discoveries were
consistent with and lent support to the Copernican viewpoint, while they
presented real problems for the traditional approach. Galilee's report of his
findings and of the instrument he used generated far more excitement about
astronomical possibilities than Kepler's work and cast him in the role of Co-
pernicus' defender.
In the Dialogue, Galileo took a non-technical qualitative account of
the Copernican system as the basis for his discussion - circles, uniform mo-
tion, and all. He did not advance the Copernican viewpoint using quantita-
tive means, except indirectly by advocating combining physics and astron-
omy, thereby making physics more mathematical. In fact, while Galileo was
aware of Kepler's earlier astronomical work, there is no indication that he
ever adopted its results. His interest was more in the physical aspects of the
situation and with what he could contribute to the discussion from his
knowledge of mechanics. Galileo did promote a highly mathematical ap-
proach to physics in this latter field, however.
Like Kepler, Galilee's mathematical viewpoint of the world was
grounded in his religious and philosophical orientation. Galileo took a tra-
ditional Augustinian viewpoint on the source of natural and scriptural reve-
lation - God is the acknowledged Author of both the book of Scripture and
the book of Nature. Therefore, divine truths revealed by either one cannot
contradict those of the other, though human interpretations of each might
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give rise to conflicts. However, he proceeded to elevate knowledge of nature.
Aristotle had said that demonstrative scientific reasoning based on sensory
experience provides necessary and certain knowledge of the world and not
mere opinion. Galileo agreed. Hence for him, results in this realm should be
given primacy and accepted by everyone, including those engaged in inter-
preting Scripture. The natural light of reason must be granted a higher pri-
ority than faith in the realm of natural knowledge. Given the Church's atti-
tude toward lay interpretations of Scripture in the wake of the Protestant
Reformation, however, Galileo knew that he had to tread very carefully in
this matter.
What makes the knowledge of nature so certain? Here Galileo, like
Kepler, proffered a mathematized view of reality whose philosophical roots
go back to Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato. The deductive structure of
geometry guarantees the certainty of its results and the use of quantity gives
it precision. Nevertheless, Galileo, like Kepler, was critical of the mystical
side of Neoplatonism. Natural philosophy is not fiction. In a work of 1623,
Galileo explained his overarching viewpoint on science with the following
well-known words:
Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands
continually open to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless
one first learns to comprehend the language and read the letters in
which it is composed. It is written in the language of mathematics, and
its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures without
which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; with-
out these, one wanders about in a dark labyrinth.'
Following Plato and the atomists and in opposition to Aristotle and
scholastic philosophers, Galileo asserted that the essential and necessary
properties of material things are the primary mathematical qualities of
number, size, shape, and speed. Sensory properties such as color or sound
aresecondary qualities and reside in the sensing subject, not in the object it-
self. Galileo thus recognized the foundational role of mathematics for sci-
ence, but he went further and reduced the central content of physics to
geometry.His views on primary and secondary qualities were echoed else-
3. Stillman Drake, Discoveries and Opinions of Calileo (New York: Doubleday Anchor
Books, 1957), pp. 237-38.
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where in Europe, though they likely arose independently, from the same an-
cient sources that fed Galilee's viewpoint.
Galileo accepted Aristotle's deductive methodology of science,' but
he gave larger roles to experience and especially to mathematics. Galileo
was especially indebted to Archimedes for his approach to mathematical
physics. Galilee's outlook in this respect is not unique, for as we noted
above, earlier natural philosophers were moving in this direction, similarly
taking inspiration from Archimedes' practice. Yet, Galileo was more thor-
oughgoing in his mathematization and ingenious in his empirical and
mathematical exploration of phenomena. His familiarity with the Renais-
sance tradition of applying mathematics to practical technology may have
helped him introduce measurements into physics. He rejected the ancient
tendency to see qualities as pairs of opposites, such as hot and cold or be-
ing at rest and being in motion, and instead treated them as measurable
quantities lying along a continuum. They are thus quantities that can be
represented by line segments. In Galilee's hands, natural science was being
transformed into a field of thought conducted mainly by means of the
ideas and methods of mathematics rather than those of syllogistic logic.
Galilee's mathematical notions were not mystical ideas floating high above
the field of physics, but were linked concretely to the way things actually
function. Experimental exploration was used by Galileo to suggest appro-
priate first principles and to eliminate or confirm hypotheses, but the core
of any true science was down-to-earth mathematics suited for the task. An
Aristotelian concept of science was combined with an Archimedean view-
point on the importance of geometry and proportion, subject to experi-
mental verification.
Galileo is best known in scientific circles for his mathematical analysis
of motion. This was published in 1638 as the central part of his Two New Sci-
ences, though his initial thoughts on motion go back nearly 50 years earlier.
In this, his last work, Galileo presented a science of motion in three parts,
first dealing with uniform motion, then with naturally accelerated motion,
and finally with projectile motion. Each section is organized in standard Eu-
clidean style, opening with the relevant definitions, axioms, and postulates,
and then proceeding to various propositions. For uniform motion, Galileo
proves several results relating speeds, times, and distances traversed, using
4. See William A. Wallace, Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof, Boston Studies in the
Philosophy of Science, vol. 137 (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992).
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the Archimedean tools of ratio and proportionality, ending with the equiva-
lent of our result that distance equals speed times time.
Regarding naturally accelerated motion due to free fall, Galileo first
notes that free fall yields uniformly accelerated motion since the results de-
rived on that basis match those gotten by his experimentation with inclined
planes. However, he also says this is to be expected since Nature always acts
in the simplest way, and the simplest type of accelerated motion is that in
which equal increments of speed are added on in equal increments of time.
The conclusions he obtains from this agree with those gotten earlier by the
Oxford Calculators (whose work he seems not to have depended upon), but
they contradicted the commonly held notion that speed is proportional to
the distance fallen. Instead, Galileo shows that distance is traversed as the
square of the time elapsed.
In the last part of the treatise, Galileo determined the path of a pro-
jectile. Mathematicians earlier conjectured that the path consisted of three
parts, a first and last straight path connected by a curved path, possibly cir-
cular. Building on his results about uniform horizontal motion and natu-
rally accelerated vertical motion and assuming that these motions main-
tained their independence when combined, Galileo was able to establish the
exact shape of the path as parabolic. Galileo understood the benefit this
gave to military art, for it enabled gunners to compile charts relating the
range of their cannon shots to the elevation chosen. Galileo was also able to
prove that the maximum range of a projectile would be achieved at half a
right angle.
Galileo proudly and rightly advertised his work on motion as an im-
portant new science. He had individually done for motion what others had
done for optical phenomena and statics - he had created a mathematical
science. Traditional natural philosophy, drawing on Aristotle's ideas of mo-
tion, treated motion in a mostly qualitative fashion. On those points where it
made quantitative assertions, it was often spectacularly wrong. The work of
the Oxford Calculators was an exception to this, but their work was abstract
mathematics, not physics. Galilee's was both physics and mathematics, treat-
ing natural (if idealized) motion. He did not focus on the cause of motion or
try to explain how motion could continue, as earlier philosophers had. In-
stead, he explored its mathematical features and established precise func-
tional dependencies, using the language of proportionality. The question ad-
dressed, using mathematics, was not why but how. This mathematical model
was to inspire other scientists in the seventeenth century and was to become
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the modus operandi of physical science. The significance of Galileo's specific
accomplishment is further put into perspective by considering the impor-
tance assigned to motion in seventeenth-century mechanistic thought:
along with the mathematical features of number, size, and shape) motion
was thought to lie at the base of all other natural phenomena. Galileo pro-
vided the mathematical foundation and some of the tools for developing
this outlook. Newton was to take Galileo's work and incorporate it into his
own later in the century, using a methodology that owed much to Galilee's
approach.
Descartes' Mechanistic Mathematical Universe
Mechanistic explanations were becoming the new wave of natural philoso-
phy. Aristotelian natural philosophy had been modeled on living organisms
and emphasized teleology, a notion of purposeful development. Now, scien-
tists were beginning to analyze phenomena largely in terms of their mathe-
matical relations and mechanical behavior. Complex automata and intricate
machines became the new model. Kepler and Galileo were far from being the
only scientists to adopt such an approach. Early in the century, Isaac
Beeckman, drawing upon a practical mechanical tradition in the Nether-
lands as well as his knowledge of Archimedes' theoretical works, was one of
the first to formulate a mechanistic outlook. Since quantitative features of
natural reality are all-important, he says, mathematics supplies the hands of
physics. These ideas exerted a lasting influence on seventeenth-century
thought through the medium of Descartes (1596-1650), who learned this
mechanistic approach first-hand from Beeckman in 1618-19.
Descartes was neither an astronomer like Kepler nor a physicist like
Galileo, though he contributed to both fields. He was primarily a systematic
philosopher, whose work in mathematics was also of the first magnitude.
The methodology and subject matter of mathematics, Descartes believed,
holds the key to natural philosophy. His goal was to argue this for all natural
phenomena, not merely astronomy, mechanics, or optics. Focusing on
shape, size, and motion advances the study of nature) for the core meaning
of matter and its primary quality is extension. Physics is nothing more than
geometry. Thus natural philosophy can be placed upon an indubitable foun-
dation, for mathematics is the paradigm of irrefutable knowledge. Galileo,
Descartes notes in a 1638 letter to Mersenne,
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philosophizes much better than the usual lot, for he ... strives to exam-
ine physical matters with mathematical reasons. In this I am completely
in agreement with him, and I hold that there is no other way of finding
the truth. But I see a serious deficiency in his ... [not] considering the
first causes of nature .... 5
According to Descartes, Galileo should have been more systematic and
built his science on a firmer metaphysical foundation. Descartes aimed to
develop a method that would solve specific scientific problems but that
would also give absolutely certain demonstrations of the true structure of all
of reality. In this respect his overall object and view of science was much the
same as that of Aristotle, though his mathematized mechanistic approach
was very differen t.
Descartes had hoped to demonstrate the veracity of the Copernican
system of the world. However, when the Roman Catholic Church con-
demned Galilee's ideas, he sought to present his own system in a way that
would not collide with the censors. This could be done, he thought, by
grounding it in a metaphysics that was consistent with Catholic theology.
Beginning with an attitude of radical doubt (in order to connteract even the
extreme skeptic), Descartes notes that doubting requires a thinking subject.
This in turn requires a trustworthy Supreme Being who can guarantee our
existence and the truth of what we know. God alone can legitimize the na-
ture and certainty of human reasoning. We humans have been given the ca-
pacity by God to generate clear and distinct ideas of things by the operation
of our minds. These innate ideas provide us with mathematical and other
notions for understanding our world.
Descartes thus proposed a strong rationalist philosophy. There are two
irreducible types of reality, according to Descartes: mental and corporeal.
Matter behaves in a completely mechanical fashion; mind comes to know
how matter acts by means of its clear and distinct ideas. Humans alone have
reason and are essentially thinking beings. All other living things are really
nothing more than automata. We can apply our reason to attain true knowl-
edge of the natural world from first principles. At times, however, especially
given the incomplete state of our knowledge, we may have to resort to hypo-
thetical reasoning, as was done earlier in astronomy. Then we must check the
5. William R. Shea, The Magic of Numbers and Motion: The Scientific Career of Rene
Descartes (Cambridge: Science History Publications, 1991), p. 312.
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deductive consequences of our hypotheses with experience to verify or fal-
sify them. Experience provides the data requiring explanation, and it helps
us to decide how to generate an explanation for them from a priori princi-
ples. While Descartes did quite a bit of experimentation in connection with
optics and physiology, its role in his thought was mainly that of determining
what Reason needs to render an explanation for and of suggesting some pos-
sible connections. True science is ultimately generated, however, by drawing
necessary conclusions from self-evident axioms known a priori by our
minds.
Descartes stressed the essential importance of method in acquiring
knowledge. The general approach that Descartes saw embodied in tbe math-
ematical method of analysis can also be called the method of philosophical
analysis. He exhorted anyone who wanted to advance in natural philosophy
to consider all relevant phenomena, analyzing and clarifying the various no-
tions involved into more basic constituent concepts, until arriving at the
simplest ideas. These ideas can then be taken as foundational, more complex
ideas being built up from them, until a theoretical explanation of the phe-
nomena is obtained. It was this rationalist approach of breaking reality
down, as one might a machine, and then reconstructing it from its ab-
stracted elements, building knowledge upon a basis of clear and distinct
ideas that attracted his followers. However, the metaphysical underpinnings
for this approach (first doubt, then God, then clear ideas), which Descartes
saw as necessary, was of less interest to many. They were captivated by Des-
cartes' vision of a mechanical universe susceptible to mathematical analysis,
but not always by his philosophical rationale.
The value of method was certainly not a new theme in philosophy, but
Descartes was the one who made it fashionable for the modern age, drawing
upon his work in mathematics. Mathematics contains not only the time-
honored deductive mode for communicating known truths, but even more
importantly, an analytic method for discovering truths. He published his
ideas on this in Discourse on Method (1637), to which he attached three ap-
pendices as proof of the value of his approach: an essay on optics, another
on meteorology, and a concluding one on geometry. Like Viete, Descartes
found vestiges of the analytic method in Arabic and Renaissance algebra and
in the geometry of Pappus and other ancient Greeks. Unlike Viete, however,
he maintained that his algebra and analytic geometry were more advanced
than those of the ancients, for he was able to solve problems that had defied
their best efforts. In his essay on geometry, we can clearly see our modern
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approach to symbolic algebra and analytic geometry taking shape. Des-
cartes' influence in this area is apparent from the similarity of his work to
what we know these fields to be, though the presentation is still somewhat
obscure in spots. In his appendix on optics, Descartes presented his law of
refraction. Others in the same period had also come to a correct understand-
ing of this law, but it was Descartes who publicized it and attempted me-
chanical explanations of it. He also offered an exemplary analysis of the ap-
pearance of the rainbow, explaining it in terms of the Sun's multiple
refraction through raindrops. Descartes' Discourse, with its famous appendi-
ces, rightly established his reputation in mathematics, physics, and philoso-
phy as an intellectual giant.
Descartes pursued his mechanistic natural philosophy in all realms,
including mechanics, astronomy, optics, and physiology. He proposed a uni-
verse completely full of particles, whose collisions with one another pro-
duced motion in accord with a number of quantitative rules, some of which
anticipate Newton's laws of motion but most of which we no longer accept
as valid. The motion of the planets about the Sun was explained in terms of
whirlpool or vortex motion of particles in the intervening space. Natural
philosophers after Descartes tried to determine the precise mathematics of
this motion, without success. Newton later discredited Cartesian physical as-
tronomy by showing that the planets' motions would require contradictory
behaviors from the vortex, but his refutation was not accepted by everyone
as sufficient reason for rejecting the general idea. In optics, Descartes ex-
plained how light travels, using various mechanical analogies, one of them
being the instantaneous transmission of pressure through the visual me-
dium. These are then used to explain reflection and refraction. Following the
lead of Kepler in his mathematical analysis of retinal images on the back of
the eye early in the century, Descartes explicitly separated the physiological
aspects of vision from perceptual cognition and treated them completely
mechanically.
Descartes' system of natural philosophy may have lacked mathemati-
cal specificity in some areas, but on many fronts it initiated a very attractive
program to be developed. Descartes showed for the first time the potential
of taking a mechanistic approach to all of nature, of treating the material
universe as a machine. In the last half of the seventeenth century and on into
the eighteenth, Descartes' system of thought commanded the highest respect
and formed the basis of further scientific work. After Descartes, Aristotelian
natural philosophy was no longer a viable system; mechanistic natural phi-
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losophy had taken its place, with Descartes' ideas in the forefront. It was
thought by some that Descartes had laid down the basic outlines of the true
system of the world and that all that remained for others to do was to fill in
the details.
Newton's Mathematical Treatment of Physics
Like every other natural philosopher of the late seventeenth century, New-
ton (1643-1727) was weaned on Descartes. He came, however, to reject Des-
cartes' thought because of its speculative rationalistic character. For Newton
was also nurtured on the ideas of his countryman Francis Bacon, who em-
phasized the need to generalize from firmly established facts.
Bacon, who wrote in the first quarter of the seventeenth century,
stressed detailed empirical investigation of reality, leading to classification
and determination of the true natures of things. His approach was not aimed
at formulating mathematical laws. Unlike his earlier namesake, Bacon did not
recognize the value of mathematics for science. He thought that mathemat-
ics' habit of abstraction was dangerous to physics, which needed to remain in
close contact with reality. Robert Boyle, Bacon's disciple living in the Carte-
sian second half of the century, had a much stronger appreciation for mathe-
matics as an aid to science and as a necessary part of mechanical philosophy
than his mentor did. However, he still failed to connect mathematics very
closely with experimental practice. He believed that mathematics was too in-
dependent of physical reality and that its fastidious precision was out of place
in the laboratory.
For many at this time, contributions of mathematics to natural philos-
ophy were largely of two sorts, either sublime speculations or mundane ob-
servations, but these were not often linked in any intimate way. Mathematics
was admitted to be an essential component of mechanical philosophy, since
the primary subvisible properties of things that determined their structure
and behavior were taken to be quantitative. However, exactly how these mi-
croscopic mathematical features determined macroscopic behavior was dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. Mechanistic natural philosophy thus
led to imaginative non-verifiable conjectures. At the same time, more as-
pects of natural phenomena were being quantified and measured more pre-
cisely in this period (time, distance, speed, weight, volume, air pressure, tem-
perature, volume, intensity of light, etc.). This gave a potential foundation
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for mathematizing various fields of thought and activity. Yet, these were
rarely connected with any mathematical theory about how things worked.
The habit of looking for quantitative functional dependencies was still weak;
most scientists continued to look for underlying causes in the presumed na-
ture of things. Moreover, many seventeenth-century scientists worked
largely in the qualitative experimental areas of natural philosophy, such as
chemistry and natural history,"
All of this changed with the arrival of Isaac Newton, whose work in the
classical sciences of optics, mechanics, and astronomy made deep connec-
tions between quantitative features of phenomena and the way the universe
worked." Newton, more than anyone else in the seventeenth century, was able
to forge an alliance between experimental research and mathematical analysis
and so realize the enormous benefits of mathematizing natural philosophy.
He synthesized earlier work in the mixed sciences and laid a foundation for
eighteenth-century developments in various other physical sciences.
Newton first demonstrated his brilliance with his investigation of col-
ors. Soon after receiving his Bachelor's degree from Cambridge in 1665,
Newton undertook a series of optical experiments to determine the nature
and behavior of colored light. Rather than holding that colors are mixtures
of light and dark, modifications of white light, as most held, Newton as-
serted the opposite, that white light is a mixture of different colors. Light can
be spread out into a spectrum by a prism because the rays of each color are
refracted according to its own characteristic degree of refrangibility. Colors
are primary for Newton; white light is the mixture. He established this revo-
lutionary viewpoint by a series of carefully controlled experiments using
various prisms, making the appropriate precise measurements and calcula-
tions to test his ideas against those of others, such as Boyle and Hooke, and
to forestall their criticisms.
He summarized his work on colors in his first paper presented to the
Royal Society (1672). In addition to describing the experimental basis for his
results and organizing his conclusions in the deductive fashion of mathe-
matics, Newton advanced a new corpuscular theory of light. It was this as-
pect of his work that received the strongest criticism by others, particularly
6. At the time, the fields that we today call biology, geology, anthropology, etc. did not
exist. "Natural history" was their predecessor. Its approach was primarily descriptive.
7. Literature on Newton's scientific work is an entire industry. See, for instance, Rich-
ard S. Westfall, Never at Rest: A Biography of Isaac Newton (Cambridge; Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1980).
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Hooke. The unpleasantness of this experience made Newton wary of includ-
ing hypothetical elements in his scientific theories, and it forced him to try
to develop a method of philosophical investigation that would prompt ra-
tional acceptance rather than dissent. In response to his critics, Newton as-
serted that in the main, he had investigated and positively established vari-
ous properties of light by means of experiments, mathematically deducing
their consequences. Only once this was accomplished, did he put forward a
conjecture to explain the behavior. This, he noted, was the proper scientific
method for doing physics.
Newton elaborated his method of philosophical inquiry in various
later works as well. Experiments must be designed to elicit answers to spe-
cific scientific questions; thus regularities of observed phenomena are iden-
tified and measured. Once general principles are arrived at by induction,
their consequences can be deduced by rigorous mathematical demonstra-
tions. Additional experiments verify these consequences as a check on the
principles. While this process may not generate absolutely certain knowl-
edge, it gets as close to it as the subject matter permits. Newton's belief on
this score conflicted with many of his peers who had come to believe that
empirically based knowledge must remain fairly tentative, and also with
those who were content to argue from hypothetical mechanical causes. New-
ton believed that true knowledge could be generated in physical science by
applying the method and ideas of mathematics to the data of experience.
After one ascertained the mathematical behavior of phenomena, one
might then attempt to discover the causes that produce such phenomena.
Newton, like both Descartes and Aristotle, desired to penetrate to the true
causes underlying the behavior of reality. Unlike Aristotle, however, he re-
mained far longer on the level of phenomenological behavior and gave pri-
ority to quantitative features of the situation. Unlike Descartes and his fol-
lowers, he was unwilling to use hypotheses to evade empirical exploration
and induction. And, unlike both, he refused to build a grand philosophical
system based on ultimate causes to encompass his results. He was content to
leave this for posterity to work out, if possible. His mathematical and experi-
mental exploration of more limited areas of thought put Newton more in
the tradition of Galileo than Descartes or Aristotle.
Mathematics, for Newton, as for Kepler, Galilee, and Descartes, held
the key to natural philosophy. Yet, for Newton it seemed to be more an oper-
ational stance than an ontological or epistemological position. Whatever the
actual nature of the physical world or the precise character of human know-
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ing, he was concerned to concentrate first on the indubitable mathematical
regularities nature exhibits. This limited focus was emphasized in the title of
his magnum opus, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687). As
Newton noted in the preface: "the whole burden of [natural] philosophy
seems to consist in this ~ from the phenomena of motions to investigate the
forces of nature, and then from these forces to demonstrate the other phe-
nomena." Since motions and forces are quantitative matters, and since dem-
onstrative knowledge of these was sought, Newton used geometry through-
out. His book was a masterful exposition devoted solely to mechanics and
astronomy, but he held out the possibility that a similar exploration in other
realms of physical behavior, such as optics or magnetism or chemistry,
would likewise uncover relevant forces operating between particles. This
suggestion, given in the context of the marvelous achievements of his work,
was to encourage similar work in other fields and foster an even stronger
viewpoint on the importance of mathematics than he himself may have en-
tertained. Newton wanted to emphasize a dynamic mathematical approach
to natural science in contrast to Descartes' more speculative mechanistic
natural philosophy, but he did not think that this exhausted everything that
could be said about how the world functioned. Nevertheless, the character of
his work did lead to a more constricted view of the methods and scope of
natural science.
The Principia resulted from about two and a half years of intense intel-
lectual work in which little else engaged Newton's attention, including food
and sleep. Like a man possessed, he threw himself into developing a force-
based mathematical theory of mechanics and astronomy. To ground his as-
tronomical conclusions, Newton first created both a version of geometry
that drew from his earlier work in calculus and a new deductive science of
mathematical dynamics that built on and corrected Descartes' mechanics.
Newton elaborated these ideas in detail, refined or defined new quantitative
concepts such as mass and inertia, and gave precise quantitative formulation
to the laws that govern motion. Newton showed in the abstract, for example,
using only mathematics, that Kepler's laws imply an inverse square law for a
centripetal force attracting two bodies that obey his laws of motion, and
conversely that an inverse square law entails Kepler's laws. Consequently,
given the physical behavior of the planets summarized by Kepler's laws, the
force of gravitational attraction between the planets and the Sun must obey
an inverse square law. He also proved that the power of gravity must be pro-
portional to the masses of the bodies involved. While Newton offered no ex-
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planation of the nature or cause of gravity, he asserted that the force of grav-
itational attraction acts uniformly throughout the universe, being able to
account for and therefore being responsible for both the movement of heav-
enly bodies and that of naturally accelerated objects on Earth. It was this
mathematical encapsulation of the cause of all natural motion, the law of
universal gravitation, that most people found so utterly amazing - that the
most diverse movements throughout the universe could be explained by a
single rather simple principle was astounding! This achievement convinced
even the most skeptical that absolutely certain knowledge of the world
might be possible using the tools of mathematics.
Newton's ingenious efforts established him as the leading mathemati-
cian and the foremost natural philosopher of Europe. No other work in the
history of science compares to the Principia in scope or importance. Newton
combined, revised, and completed Galilee's science of motion, Descartes'
mechanics, and Kepler's mathematical analysis of celestial motion, treating
them all in his own new mathematical science of dynamics and astronomy.
Notwithstanding this accomplishment, not everyone was ready to accept the
intrusion of what seemed to be an occult force acting at a distance (gravity)
into natural philosophy. In fact, resistance by Huygens and Leibniz on this
point kept Cartesian natural philosophy alive for some time into the eigh-
teenth century. However, the coherence, simplicity, scope, and depth of
Newton's system were universally admired and eventually helped to over-
come the opposition. Newton had shown how to unify various aspects of
physical science in one simple harmonious mathematical system, and his
success gave others hope of making additional conquests by the same math-
ematical and mechanical method. Newton's system of the world set the fu-
ture course of Western thought and helped to define the modern worldview.
More narrowly, it established a new mode of mathematizing natural science.
Before Newton there were expert experimentalists and accomplished mathe-
maticians, but few top-rank mathematical experimentalists. Newton's ap-
proach gave both experiment and mathematics their due. Now analysis
(quantitative experimentation, involving measurements, leading to appro-
priate inductive generalizations) and synthesis (logical deduction from ac-
cepted principles, using mathematical theories, concepts, and techniques de-
signed for the purpose) became full partners in the scientific process.
Quantitative measurements were tied to theoretical analysis and related by
means of functional dependencies, and mathematical tools were developed
to help analyze experiential phenomena. Mathematics and physics were now
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fused on a deep level, making it possible to predict behavior of phenomena
with great precision and to communicate these results in a universal lan-
guage of clear and distinct ideas. Newton overestimated the ability of experi-
ment to determine scientific principles, and he underestimated the hypo-
thetical element involved in this process, but his emphasis on grounding
scientific work in experimentation and placing restrictions on hypotheses
was a necessary antidote to the practices and outlooks of many of his con-
temporaries.
Newton is also well known as one of the main fonnders of calcnlns.
This is not the place to discuss his role in the history of calculus, but we will
comment briefly on how his calculus fits into the mathematization of sci-
ence. Newton's notion of fluxion, which he began working with already in
1665, is essentially a time derivative. Treating all variable quantities as mag-
nitudes changing over time (fluents), his method of fluxions enabled him to
conceptualize velocity and acceleration as mathematical notions and pro-
duce techniques for calculating rates of change when the rule for this change
was known. He was also able to reverse the process and find fluents (func-
tions) when their fluxions (derivatives) were known. Having discovered and
demonstrated the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, Newton could use
these reverse methods for calculating areas, volumes, and arc lengths. None
of these things appear in Newton's Principia, which was written using the
classical language of geometry, but their relevance to the topics it covers
should be quite apparent, and later mathematicians in the eighteenth cen-
tury recast and extended his mechanics using the apparatus of calculus. Nat-
ural science deals with dependency and change; calculus is the premier the-
ory of functional change. In this respect, too, Newton contributed in an
essential way to the mathematization of physical science.
Leibniz's Mathematization of Thought
The other principal founder of calculus was Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716).
Though he arrived at his ideas about a decade after Newton, he was first to
publish (1684) and attracted the two Bernonlli brothers to help him develop
them further. Using notions of the snm and difference of infinitesimally
small quantities, Leibniz made the differential the centerpiece of his brand
of calculus. The first calculus textbook, written by I'Hcpital in 1696, fol-
lowed this approach. Leibniz's ideas and notation soon became standard in
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Germany, France, and Holland, while Newton's were largely stranded on the
British Isles. After some initial acrimonious exchanges regarding priority of
discovery, each side maintained the superiority of its approach without very
much positive interaction with the other side for over a century.
Leibniz's ideas on calculus contributed more to the actual process of
mathematization than Newton's, since his version became the tool of choice
for eighteenth -century mathematical science, which was principally devel-
oped by Continental scientists. However, there is another side to Leibniz's
thought that is even more strongly devoted to mathematization. That is his
scheme for developing a universal calculus of thought.
Leibniz, like Kepler, Galileo, and Descartes, emphasized the ontologi-
cal and epistemological value of quantification. Like many others at the end
of the seventeenth century, Leibniz found a mechanistic viewpoint of sci-
ence very appealing and strongly promoted it in his works. The essential
properties of things are those which can be quantified: size, shape, position,
motion, and force. Without the use of quantitative explanations, no under-
standing of the world is possible; with it, one can determine why things are
the way they are and why they cannot be otherwise. For the philosopher
Leibniz, as for his predecessors Aristotle and Descartes, the goal of science
was obtaining necessary, demonstrative knowledge about the world. Like
Descartes, Leibniz sought to ground natural philosophy in the nature of
God through metaphysical argumentation. Leibniz found Newton's work
rather deficient on this score; his system of the world would run quite as well
without God as with Him.
In order to extend mathematics' success in generating absolutely cer-
tain knowledge to other fields of thought, Leibniz advocated the dual pro-
cess of analysis and synthesis. This theme had its proximate source in the late
sixteenth century and echoed throughout the seventeenth century, Descartes
being the most important instance. On the surface, Leibniz's description of
the dual process sounds quite traditional. Analysis means breaking down
each concept/proposition into its prerequisite concepts/antecedent proposi-
tions and these into theirs, until finally arriving at the most primitive con-
cepts/first principles. Synthesis means reversing the process and using these
foundational results to define/prove the given concepts/propositions.
Leibniz believed that this process could be applied in any area of human
thought, not just mathematical science. By means of rational analysis, the
basic concepts and principles of a given field can be determined, and these
can then be combined to yield truths to which all rational beings will have to
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give assent. This emphasis on analysis would continue to gain strength into
the eighteenth century, especially since analysis was associated with the field
of algebra, which had been successfully widened to produce both analytic
geometry and, with the work of Leibniz, calculus.
So far, Leibniz has merely amplified Descartes' approach, but he next
gave the whole procedure a further twist that revealed his extreme commit-
ment to mathematization. The process of analysis and synthesis, he believed,
can be effected in a mathematical way by choosing appropriate symbols for
the basic concepts and their combinations and then calculating with them to
obtain the consequences of the principles, much as is done in ordinary alge-
bra. Already in his Dissertation on the Combinatorial Art (1666), Leibniz gave
voice to this vision: "there would be no more need of disputation between
two philosophers than between two accountants. For it would suffice to take
their pencils in their hands) and say to each other: Let us calculate." Eleven
years later, after he had begun developing his differential and integral calcu-
lus, he reiterated the point, in the following words: "All inquiries that depend
on reasoning would be performed ... by a kind of calculus .... And if some-
one would doubt what I advanced I should say to him: Let us count, sir; and
thus by taking to pen and ink, we should soon settle the question.'" Leibniz's
notion of a universal rational calculus that can be used to formulate and
solve problems in all areas of human activity may seem an extremely naive
form of utopian rationalism) but a similar hope has motivated others in
Western culture since the time of Leibniz. Boole's algebraic logic of the mid-
nineteenth century, for instance, matched some of Leibniz's ideas almost ex-
actly, though it was developed independently. Aspects of computer science
in our own era - the development of expert systems and the strong pro-
gram of Artificial Intelligence (we will discuss this in detail in Chapter 9)-
can also be viewed as intellectual descendants of Leibniz's brainchild.
It is clear that Leibniz is on Descartes' side of the philosophical seesaw
pitting reason against experience. Leibniz stresses the value of a priori rea-
soning over experience. He thought that British scientists, such as Boyle,
overdid it with all their emphasis on experimentation. The senses are unable
to give rise to certain knowledge. Natural science demands more, which only
demonstrative reasoning can satisfy. Leibniz's attitude toward a rational
8. Alistair C. Crombie, Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition: The His-
tory of Argument and Explanation Especially in the Mathematical and Biomedical Sciences and
Arts, 3 vols. (London: Duckworth, 1994), p. 1009.
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physics, combined with Descartes' similar sentiments, overpowered New-
ton's more balanced approach in subsequent developments. Eighteenth-
century thinkers expanded the fields of physics opened up by Newton and
went into related fields as well, but they did so using the rationalistic ap-
proach of Descartes and Leibniz. The lure of being able to attain absolute
truth through human reason and mathematics was too strong to resist.
The Ongoing Mathematization of Natural Science
Eighteenth-century mathematics was primarily mixed mathematics. Mathe-
matical research in calculus and differential equations went hand in hand
with work in the mathematical sciences of mechanics, astronomy, fluid me-
chanics, acoustics, and others. There was no such thing at the time as sepa-
rate fields of pure and applied mathematics, although distinct areas of math-
ematics did start to separate from physics as the century wore on.
Eighteenth-century mathematics' being tied to science meant that the
mixed sciences were still as much a part of mathematics as they were of
physical science. This fit the classical approach going back to the Greeks, but
in the eighteenth century it was part of the Cartesian legacy, augmented by
Leibniz's viewpoint. As we noted above) Newton's own approach, which em-
phasized experimentation as well as mathematics, was neglected by many
eighteenth-century scientists, especially, ironically enough, in the field of
mechanics, where a strong a priori rationalist approach predominated.
Leading scientists such as d' Alembert (1743) and Lagrange (1788)
treated mechanics as a closed mathematical system whose results could be
rigorously demonstrated from necessary first principles. This was accompa-
nied by banishing geometry from mechanics and reformulating mechanics
in purely analytical terms, sometimes without any diagrams or reference to
spatial content. Such a treatment of mechanics was usually coupled with a
deterministic philosophy of nature. Mechanics was thus deemed capable of
generating absolutely certain knowledge about the ultimate structure of the
world. Given the initial conditions of the world system, one could in princi-
ple predict the future state of the entire material world at any time. This sort
of mathematical determinism was present in Laplace's analytic treatment of
astronomy (1799), which showed that Newton's system of the world was
even more stable than had been previously thought. Eighteenth-century
mathematical scientists also advanced other areas of physical science worked
184
Mathematization and Modern Science
on by Newton, such as fluid mechanics and acoustics. They attempted to
place them on a firmer mathematical basis of self-evident mechanical prin-
ciples and explore their deductive consequences using techniques of algebra
and calculus.
The areas of electricity, magnetism, heat, and chemistry remained
largely experimental during the first half of the eighteenth century as scien-
tists were becoming more familiar with the basic phenomena they exhibited.
By the end of the century, however, scientists had learned how to define and
measure different quantities associated with them, using instruments de-
signed for the task, and in some cases had begun to formulate mathematical
theories for them. In 1787 Coulomb published the results of his carefully
controlled experiments in static electricity and magnetism, establishing in-
verse square laws for both types of attraction, just as for gravity. In the first
half of the nineteenth century, a deeper analysis of electromagnetic phe-
nomena by Faraday and others led to an impressive unified mathematical
treatment of all these fields by Maxwell in 1865, using notions of vector
analysis.
Joseph Black was responsible for initiating a quantitative approach to
heat. He first distinguished quantity of heat from temperature in 1760, relat-
ing the two by means of the notion of specific heat or capacity for heat. He
also introduced the notion of latent heat associated with change of state. A
fully mathematical treatment of heat, however, had to wait until early in the
nineteenth century, when Fourier studied heat diffusion (1822), investigat-
ing it with what we now call Fourier series.
The related area of chemistry became more mathematical by quantify-
ing heat, but also through the systematic use of weight, measured by im-
proved balances. The need to make precise metallurgical analyses of ores for
mining provided a strong economic impulse for quantitative chemistry by
mid-century. Lavoisier's reform of chemistry (1789) made it more mathe-
matical in a couple of senses. It introduced a more systematic way of naming
and symbolizing chemical substances, and it attempted (though only with
partial success) to use weights and equations to explain chemical reactions.
A more thorough and deeper mathematization of chemistry came about
when Dalton put forward his atomic theory in 1808. Using his notion of
atomic weight and the law of definite proportions formulated by Proust a
decade earlier, scientists could now explain chemical reactions quantitatively
in a systematic manner.
Developments during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries thus
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made it abundantly clear that the influence of mathematics in natural sci-
ence was not about to dry up any time soon. Rather than assisting with a few
matters in mechanics and then retiring to its own corner, mathematics con-
tinued to find significant and essential employment in the physical sciences.
The stream of scientific mathematization continued to swell exponentially
over time and has grown unabated into our own era, with no sign of let-up.
Obviously the mathematical approach of modern science has uncovered
genuine and intrinsic connections between natural phenomena and mathe-
matical concepts and techniques. This conclusion seems undeniable. The
question that this success often leaves unasked, however, is whether there
may be important aspects that have been overlooked due to taking a rather
narrow quantitative perspective. And, more importantly, whether the
achievements of mathematical science and the elevated view of mathemati-
cal truth have given false encouragement to other areas of human life to pur-
sue mathematization where it is less appropriate. We will address some of
these matters in the next chapter.
Mathematization of Science
and the Modern Worldview
Developments in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century natural science
brought about a major change in people's perception of the world. At the be-
ginning of this period the world was still a universe full of inherent purpose
and Christian mystery, though a number of people were becoming skeptical
about the validity of knowledge provided by Aristotelian philosophy and
traditional religion. By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, the
world envisioned by Europe's leading thinkers was one of matter in motion
operating mechanically according to universal mathematical laws. Mathe-
matical science began to replace scriptural revelation as the acknowledged
authority about the nature of the world. Guided by this mechanistic and
mathematical outlook, natural philosophy had made remarkable progress in
producing certain and reliable knowledge about the physical world.
The role of human agents in such a mechanical universe was unclear
and problematic. For some, humans transcended nature on account of their
rational faculties. Humans also had free will that enabled them to be more
than passive lumps of matter obeying deterministic laws of Nature. Others
felt that the methodology of mathematical science should be pushed as far as
186
187
Mathematization and Modern Science
possible. Given its grand successes in astronomy, optics, and mechanics, why
not adopt a similar approach in analyzing human nature and social behav-
ior? This path seemed to them to hold the potential for finally arriving at in-
controvertible objective truths in these areas as well.
OUI next chapter examines some of these more radical developments;
we will conclude this chapter by first summarizing what we have learned
about the mathematization of natural science and then evaluating these de-
velopments from a Christian perspective.
Historical Summary: The
Mathematization of Modern Science
The dominant role played by mathematics in natural philosophy in the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries is closely connected with its philosophical
heritage. The original Pythagorean viewpoint, adopted and modified by Pla-
tonic and Neoplatonic philosophies, deified mathematics, raising it to a po-
sition of absolute importance for scientific knowledge. Mathematics alone
was seen as capable of penetrating the secrets of the universe, of tracking all
things back to their lair. This pagan viewpoint went virtually unchallenged
by medieval thinkers. It also influenced a number of Renaissance develop-
ments. A revival of Neoplatonism along with Pythagorean-like Hermeticism
in the late Renaissance encouraged early modern thinkers to elevate mathe-
matics far above the place given it by traditional natural philosophy.
However, more than philosophy was responsible for the exalted posi-
tion of mathematics. Mathematics also made itself indispensable in the arts
and in the arena of practical affairs during the Renaissance. Here a number
of very down-to-earth connections between mathematics and reality were
established. This assumed a vastly different role for mathematics than that
envisioned by mystical mathematical philosophers, but it was one that nev-
ertheless emphasized the essential necessity of mathematics. Recovery of a
number of ancient Greek works, both in mathematics proper as well as
mathematical science, also gave a boost to mathematization. Toward the be-
ginning of the modern era, the works of Archimedes exerted a strong posi-
tive influence by demonstrating just what could be accomplished in mathe-
matical science.
As Kepler, Galileo, and Descartes worked out their philosophical per-
spectives in mathematical science, their impressive achievements established
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a closer working relationship between mathematics and natural philosophy
and seemed to validate their mathematized approach. Newton seems to have
entertained a more moderate view of mathematics' place in the universe, but
his success in determining the mathematical principles of natural philoso-
phy only gave additional momentum to mathematization in science. Ad-
vances in mathematics itself also made a strong impression on scientists.
Tools were now available for tackling problems that the ancients could not
even formulate, much less solve. The magnificent success of mathematics
seemed to feed the philosophical perspective that gave it birth, producing a
spiral of scientific progress and mathematized scientific philosophy.
By the start of the eighteenth century, mathematical science had trans-
formed natural philosophy in a revolutionary way. The enterprise was no
longer what it was at the start of the modern era. The goal of mathematical
science was simultaneously more modest and more ambitious than that of
natural philosophy. It was more modest in that now the goal of science was
restricted to describing mathematically the way natural phenomena func-
tion. This involved a twofold reduction: only mathematical features were
thought relevant now, and the ultimate nature of things need not be deter-
mined, only its behavior. On the other hand, the goal of mathematical sci-
ence was more ambitious, for it aimed to plumb the very depths of reality
with detailed mathematical precision and logical certainty. It was not con-
tent to settle for postulating occult causes or constructing a deductive sys-
tem of hypothetical knowledge, but intended to specify how reality actually
works on a deep level.
The success of mathematical science in achieving what was judged to
be universally true knowledge of the world made it the envy of all olber areas
of thought. As we will see in the next chapter, various social sciences and hu-
manities followed suit, using the rational methodology and techniques of
mathematical science. In that way they hoped to push back ignorance and
rise to the level of science themselves. Uncovering basic laws of human na-
ture and society, they would then be better able to master it and so gain con-
trol over human destiny.
Looking back on these developments with historical hindsight, we can
see fruitful connections between philosophical perspectives and positive sci-
entific work, but we can also see the limitations and aberrations that this col-
laboration produced on a broader scale. Science, powered by mathematics,
was installed as the source of absolutely certain, objective knowledge, or at
least, as the source of the very best knowledge that was humanly possible.
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Human Reason muscled out Divine Revelation in the end, though it did not
start that way. The development of modern science was closely associated
with Christianity, and Christians were deeply involved in developing it,' but
this collaboration was pursued with an insufficiently critical testing of the
philosophy that came along with it. As time went on, scientific philosophy
first moved to a deistic viewpoint in which God no longer had any lasting
role to play in his mechanistic universe. It finally became a naturalistic view-
point in which God was completely irrelevant, if he even existed.
The Role of Mathematics in
the Modern Scientistic Worldview
What part has mathematics played in the development of this secular out-
look? Mathematics has contributed centrally to the modern scientistic
worldview, through both its content and its methodology. We will look at
each of these briefly in turn.
The aspects of reality that are considered important for scientific work
in the modern era are the primary qualities associated with quantity: num-
ber, size, shape, position, motion, and force. Other aspects of reality are
ruled out as irrelevant or reducible to those of mathematics. Scientific mea-
surements generated by experiments provide the numbers upon which the
techniques of mathematics operate. Scientific laws stipulate functional de-
pendencies holding between such magnitudes. Mathematical theories ex-
plain the lawful regularities of observed phenomena and predict behavior.
This role for mathematics holds in the physical sciences; it was extrapolated
into other natural, social, and human sciences as well. Today numbers and
graphs are used for quantifying anything and everything. Quantifying gives
knowledge, and knowledge is power. At the very least, statistics have now in-
vaded every part of our life, presumably giving us an objective basis for ra-
tional decision-making.
The methodology of mathematics has also had a great impact upon
the development of the modern scientistic worldview. We can distinguish
9. This theme has been developed by a number of works on science and religion, such
as Nancy R. Pearcey and Charles B.Thaxton, The Soul of Science: Christian Faith and Natural
Philosophy (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway Books, 1994). Our treatment of mathematization in
Western culture looks at the relation between Christian thought and science from quite a
different perspective.
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two main aspects here. On the one hand, the traditional axiomatic method
of mathematics contributed its view of truth and consequences to science.
The ultimate goal of physical science, according to the modern view, was to
determine absolutely certain first principles and then to logically derive all
other results in the field from them using the tools of mathematics. In this
way, one will arrive at the most certain knowledge possible, given the empir-
ieal nature of the subject matter. Different people evaluated the attainability
of this goal and the need for experimentation differently, but arriving at cer-
tain knowledge remained the goal of science. Over time, it was thought, sci-
entific progress would generate closer and closer approximations to the
truth.
On the other hand, the analytic tradition in mathematics revived a
more general notion of analysis that became the paradigm for how scientific
discovery should proceed in all areas. The period from Descartes through
the Enlightenment can aptly be called the Age of Analysis. Mathematics also
provided a well-developed science of analysis, which in the end included al-
gebra, analytic geometry, calculus, and differential equations. These areas
provided the ideas and techniques that helped physics analyze basic con-
cepts, solve problems, and derive results from given principles or conditions
using algorithmic procedures. Mathematical analysis provided the motive
power for the scientific revolution.
A Christian Response to Western
Mathematization of Science
What might a Christian perspective on mathematics have to say about all of
this? First, a Christian perspective on mathematics can acknowledge with
appreciation the positive contributions that mathematics has made to the
development of natural science. The process of mathematization has uncov-
ered .ntimate connections between mathematics and science that reveal the
marvelous coherence of creation - something for which we can glorify
God. Furthermore, pursuing such knowledge is consonant with a Christian
vision of human beings as God's stewards of his creation. That is, an en-
riched mathematical understanding of how the natural world behaves can
help us serve God's purposes in various areas of life. Mathematical knowl-
edge helps us fulfill the cultural mandate given to humanity by God in the
garden of Eden.
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As Christians, we can also give assent to the reality-oriented stance of
the modern scientific outlook: the subject matter of mathematics is certainly
relevant to our experience of created reality, and vice versa. Mathematics is
not a purely human mental construction, even though mathematics obvi-
ously involves the rational operations of our own minds - abstraction, gen-
eralization, comparison, deduction, etc. A Christian outlook on the nature
of mathematical objects agrees with Platonism to this extent: mathemati-
cians discover lawful regularities in conceptual entities whose existence and
properties are largely independent of human intellectual activity.
On the other hand, while affirming mathematics as a good gift of God
for understanding quantitative aspects of our world, a Christian perspective
on mathematics will take exception to those aspects of the modern world-
view that arise from the absolutization of mathematics. Mathematization
frequently rejects non-mathematical aspects of life as unimportant or non-
existent and so promotes a lopsided vision of reality. Such a reductionistic
program denies the validity of the rich variety of aspects within creation that
go beyond quantitative properties. Radical mathematization only works
when people are willing to narrow down their perspective of what is real,
when they accommodate reality to mathematics as well as conversely.'? As
Christians, we should instead hold a more modest view of the nature of
mathematics and its accomplishments, and we should welcome other di-
mensions of reality as complementary to those studied by mathematics.
Thus the perspectives of the craftsman fashioning a beautiful object, the
dramatist using words to create powerful portrayals of emotions, and the
historian who interprets the meaning of past developments, ought to be re-
spected equally with that of mathematics. A Christian perspective will deny
the modern claim that mathematics has a corner on the truth about the
world, that it is the final arbiter of all meaning. Mathematics cannot pene-
trate to the very essence of the universe; God is more/other than a supreme
mathematician. The world has non-mathematical as well as mathematical
structure.
Rejecting mathematical imperialism, a Christian perspective on math-
ematics allows us to consider alternative visions of how God, humans, and
the world are interrelated with respect to mathematics. In the Neoplatonic
10.This point is argued by a number of case studies in Theodore M. Porter, Trust in
Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1995).
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outlook, adopted by various seventeenth-century thinkers, humans thought
God's mathematical thoughts after him in order to understand the structure
of the world, and these thoughts were seen as eternal and essential to God's
nature. Such a view tends to deify mathematics, as we have seen. If we do not
equate mathematics with necessary knowledge that is true of all possible
worlds, we can entertain other ideas about how mathematical knowledge
arises in human experience. We may not accept the postmodern alternative
to modernism on this point, but we are certainly freed to explore other op-
tions than Neoplatonic rationalism.
Finally, a Christian perspective will view human beings more as inte-
gral parts of creation than what is envisioned by dualistic, rationalistic phi-
losophy. Humans are not rational agents set over against the rest of reality;
we are not thinking beings situated in a material world that possesses only
primary quantitative features. Nor are we masters of our destiny or in con-
trol of science and culture solely because of our mathematical scientific abil-
ities. We are creatures of the Lord, meant to exercise our analytical and
quantitative abilities in the service of other people and the rest of creation,
not to further our own ends or challenge God's sovereignty. As Christians,
we must take responsibility for what mathematics we develop and how it is
applied in the world around us. Our overall motivation should be service,
not mastery and control. In the chapters that follow, we will develop these
ideas in further detail and present a positive alternative to both the modern
and the postmodern outlooks on mathematics.
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